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Some Considerations on the Evolution 
of Defining ”Fascism”*
ROXANA MARIN
”The term ’fascism’ can be applied to the entire broad genus only at the cost 
of depriving it of any specific content.”1
”It will be seen that, as used, the word ’Fascism’ is almost entirely meaningless. 
In conversation, of course, it is used even more wildly than in print. I have 
heard it applied to farmers, shopkeepers, Social Credit, corporal punishment, 
fox-hunting, bull-fighting, the 1922 Committee, the 1941 Committee, Kipling, 
Gandhi, Chiang Kai-Shek, homosexuality, Priestley’s broadcasts, Youth Hostels, 
astrology, women, dogs and I do not know what else.”2
Simultaneously defined as a ”palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism” 
imbued with desiderata of rebirth and regeneration3, a fatal symbiosis among 
transcendence, militarism, statism, nationalism and cleansing4, pure and simple 
”anti-modernism”5, the paradigm of the three negations6, vigorously denounced as 
”the product of capitalism”7, of ”a cultural or moral breakdown in inter-war Europe”8 
or classified as the resultant of ”a certain stage of economic growth, or special historical 
sequence of national economic development”9, fascism still remains a matter under 
harsh and heated debate. One conspicuous indication for the on-going debate is exactly 
* I would like to thank to Mr. Mihai Chioveanu, PhD, Associate Professor at the Department 
of Political Science, for his lectures, his suggestions and guidance in a bibliographical shaw and 
his support all throughout the writing of this text.
1 Stanley G. PAYNE, ”Spanish Fascism in Comparative Perspective”, Iberian Studies, vol. II, 
no. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 3-12.
2 George ORWELL, ”What is Fascism ?”, Tribune, 1944 apud Sonia BROWNELL-ORWELL, 
Ian ANGUS (eds.), The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. III: As I Please, 
1943-1945, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1968. 
3 Roger GRIFFIN, The Nature of Fascism, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991, p. 44.
4 Michael MANN, Fascists, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK) and New York, 
2004.
5 Henry Ashby TURNER, Jr., ”Fascism and Modernization”, in IDEM (ed.), Reappraisals of 
Fascism, Franklin Watts, New York, 1975, pp. 117-140.
6 Ernst NOLTE, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, 
Holt Rhinehart & Winston, New York, 1965. Fascism is both resistance to modernity and to 
”transcendence”.
7 Nicos POULANTZAS, Fascism and Dictatorship, NLB, London, 1974. Fascism is, more 
precisely, ”an exceptional form of capitalist state”.
8 George Lachmann MOSSE, ”Towards a General Theory of Fascism”, in IDEM (ed.), 
International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills & 
London, 1979, pp. 1-41. 
9 A.F.K. ORGANSKI, ”Fascism and Modernization”, in Stuart Joseph WOOLF (ed.), The 
Nature of Fascism, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1968, pp. 19-41. 
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the lack of any consensus on the definition of the generic fascism, while the constant 
distortion beyond recognition of the meaning and the connotations of the concept 
during half a century of usage in the common language makes the task of defining still 
more problematic for the scholarly. Moreover, it is particularly in times of social and 
economic crises, doubled by political instability and societal insecurity, that nationalist 
radicalism irrupts most vividly and violently. Hence, fascism, unpredictable and 
spontaneous, might easily find fertile soil in these unclear contexts, it becomes veritable 
fire in the minds of men once the match of socio-economic frustrations is stricken. 
Since, nowadays, what seems to be the crisis of postmodernism had already swept 
away popular expectations and had seriously shaken national economies, it would 
not probably be a disparity to predict that fascism could at any moment reemerge as 
actual and potent. The conjecture of fascism as ”the product of post-capitalism” could 
be, sooner or later, verified to some extent. It is in this conjuncture that the study of 
fascism becomes most actual and stringent, its findings and conclusions more enriching 
for society’s knowledge and subsequent development, its outcomes more valuable 
for society not to repeat its extremely painful mistakes, its catastrophic historical 
wrongdoings. True, formulating a definition for ”generic fascism” is instrumental, for 
it provides a normative and paradigmatic scheme for further inquiry into the topic. 
However, much more problematic and pertinent seems to be the identification and 
evaluation of those – sometimes pompously coined as – ”exceptional” cases, i.e. the 
national, locally-based, perspectives of analysis when dealing with fascism.
Normatively, inventing a vocabulary that would constitute in an explanatory 
framework for the anatomy of fascism and its ambiguous and tortuous relations with 
communism, capitalism, radical rightism, modernization, etc., seems a Sisyphus’s 
task. Descriptively, a scientific endeavor into the national histories of the countries 
facing fascism can offer a starting point in defining the phenomenon. In addition and 
by opposition, it could shed some light on newly emerged collocations that have the 
great merit of further confusing the fascist problematic: ”neo-fascism”, ”post-fascism”, 
even ”stalino-fascism”. Twenty-first century’s movements that may resemble fascism 
are increasingly hard to analyze and explain in the absence of a viable, working 
definition of ”generic fascism”.
Two issues are particularly instrumental in addressing the topic of fascism during 
the first stages of inquiry and research. First, carefully – not skillfully – looking into and 
interpreting national histories of different countries experiencing fascism provides a 
crucial part of the explanation, most importantly and basically because national history 
tends to shape cultural traits and future developments. Of course, cultural relativism 
thesis is by no means a way to take in this sense, though the ingrate and pending 
position of what Malia calls ”the Second Europe”1 – in which Germany is central – 
can offer a hint regarding cultural, historical, developmental differences Europe was 
struggling with in the interwar period. Moreover, though one may convincingly argue 
that fascism was a sudden, unexpected event, a terrible shock wave that was meant to 
retreat somehow exactly because of its intensity or an accident, accounts on national 
histories and their lessons can definitely point out marks of cultural and political 
recurrence that can furthermore isolate preconditions necessary and sufficient for such 
episodes as fascism, making them predictable and avoidable, given some right political 
1 Martin E. MALIA, History’s Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World, 
Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2006, pp. 18-20.
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decisions taken at the right time. Sonderweg is a quite clear example in this sense, being 
linked to both national history and political culture that puts a marked imprint on 
the allegedly eight cultural traits of German ”spirit”: authoritarianism, militarism, 
ethnocentrism, extreme nationalism, antisemitism, xenophobia, anti-liberalism and 
racism1. But these cultural features are of no relevance on the rise of fascism, if the 
fashion in which the leaders perceive political power is neglected. The entire sequence 
of asematic comparisons, directly, immediately connected to aspects of national 
history (e.g. the absence of a revolution in 1848, but an aborted attempt of negotiated 
unification; the issue of late unification, that indicates moreover a problem of agreement 
and consensus at the level of elites; the very fact that the German unification was 
possible only through ”blood and iron”, i.e. the violent nature of the late unification; 
the continuous economic and political pressure that France primarily exerted on 
postwar defeated Germany, doubled by a stringently felt revanchist sentiment of the 
masses and a profound intrinsic popular frustration, etc.) conspicuously shows the 
asynchronism in terms of political (i.e. democratic) development that Germany had 
acutely struggled with, as compared to the highly developed Western democracies. 
Aspects linking national political culture with the national historical background are 
indeed problematic and pose serious difficulties in assessing their importance for the 
rise of fascism. The eight cultural characteristics, historically proven, coupled with 
the popular perception, dominant in Germany during the interwar period, that the 
country was backstabbed by both its external enemies on the international arena and, 
most importantly, its internal enemies (primarily the Jews), plus the ”völkisch” ideology 
of the Wilhelminian era, installed the general mood that prepared the emergence of the 
fascist movement in Germany.
This is not to say, by all means, that a definition and an explanation of generic 
fascism are caducous and void of significance. Reading fascism from the prism of 
specific, nationally located, cases does not annul the relevance of the generic inquiry 
into those features the phenomenon displays in all – or the large majority of – particular 
cases. Devising such an explanatory-descriptive apparatus is nonetheless extremely 
challenging and, more often than not, it tends to reduce the case studies to cliché-istic 
instances. However, the importance of analyzing generic fascism lies in its merit of 
attempting at establishing a comprehensive definition that is usually the enumeration of 
those characteristics constituting the minimum minimorum of what historians, sociologists, 
political scientists, etc, coin as ”fascism” or what Payne labels ”the fascist minimum”2. 
1 Gabriel Abraham ALMOND, Sidney VERBA, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton University Press, 1963. The two scholars quote in their treatment 
of German case: Richard M. BRICKNER, Is Germany Incurable ?, J.B. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 
1943; David RODNICK, Postwar Germans: An Anthropologist’s Account, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1948; Bertram H. SCHAFFNER, Fatherland. A Study of Authoritarianism in the German 
Family, Colombia University Press, New York, 1948. See also, Gabriele Lee McGOWAN, The 
Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to the Present, Pearson Education & Longman, Harlow (UK), 2002. 
2 Stanley G. PAYNE, A History of Fascism, 1914-45, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 5. Payne’s 
comprehensive definition of fascism is to be found in Fascism: Comparison and Definition, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1980, pp. 3-21 and 191-212. In addition, Payne 
reproduces the quite compelling, multifaceted definition provided by Emilio Gentile, whose 
definitions alone deserve a separate lengthier account.
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Some scholars (like Payne1 or Mayer2) define ”fascism” by distinguishing it from – or 
opposing it to – the ”conservative-authoritarian” right and the ”radical” right, or the 
”reactionary” and the ”conservative” right, respectively. For others3, fascism appears as 
the extremis on an ideological continuum, as the extreme of the center. Still others adopt 
a Marxist stance in evaluating fascism as ”a phenomenon of developed industrial states 
[of advanced ”capitalist” societies], triggered by a severe socio-economic crisis”4, while 
Eugen Weber defines two subtypes of fascism in an attempt to reach the subtleties of 
the concept: ”the fascist proper” (i.e. the Italian case, pragmatic, moderate, conservative) 
and ”the national socialist” type (i.e. the German case, theoretically based, radical, much 
more destructive)5. Finally, Gilbert Allardyce defines the phenomenon through what is 
not: a generic concept, an ideology, a personality type6; and the author of The Anatomy 
of Fascism refers to it as a set of ”mobilizing passions”, 
”a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community 
decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, 
and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, 
working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons 
democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethnical 
or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion”7.
Others, be they democrats or Marxists, engage in sophisticated metaphors, further 
codifying and encrypting rather than actually conceptualizing the notion which is 
transformed into ”something” dystopian virtually indefinable and inexplicable: 
Gramsci uses ”morbid phenomen[on generated by] an interregnum […] in which the 
1 Stanley G. PAYNE, A History of Fascism, 1914-45, cit., pp. 15-19
2 Arno Joseph MAYER, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956: An Analytic 
Framework, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 54-69 and 119.
3 Seymour Martin LIPSET, ”Fascism – Left, Right and Centre”, in IDEM, The Political Man: 
The Social Bases of Politics, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (Maryland), 1981, 
pp. 131-137.
4 Martin KITCHEN, Fascism, Macmillan & St. Martin’s Press, London & Basingstoke, 1976, 
pp. 83-91. Furthermore, Kitchen continues in the same Marxist vein, by considering fascism ”a 
response to a large and organized working class, […] an offensive [against it]”, recruiting its 
followers from a ”politicized, threatened, and frightened petite bourgeoisie [and, sometimes, 
from an ”aristocracy of labour”]” and bearing as the main social function the ”stabiliza[tion], 
strengthening, and [the] transform[ation of] capitalist property relations”. Finally, fascism 
is ”a terror regime which dispenses with all the trappings of parliamentary democracy”. 
Throughout his characterization, the scholar maintains the same Marxist, economically-
deterministic rhetoric. 
5 Eugen WEBER, Varieties of Fascism. Doctrines of Revolution in 20th Century, Van Nostrand, 
New York, 1964. Payne discusses the Weberian dichotomy in A History of Fascism, 1914-45, cit., 
pp. 465-466.
6 Gilbert ALLARDYCE, ”What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept”, in 
American Historical Review, vol. 84, no. 2, April 1979, pp. 367-388. Allardyce is famous for having 
rejected the idea of ”generic fascism”.
7 Robert PAXTON, The Anatomy of Fascism, Penguin Books, London, 2005, p. 218. Nine are 
the ”mobilizing passions”. Except its excessive preoccupation with ideological prerequisites, 
Paxton’s definition is one of the most comprehensive.
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old id dying and the new cannot be born”1, Peter Drucker employs ”black magic”2, 
Daniel Guérin prefers the collocation ”the brown plague”3.
Following Eatwell4, whose attempt in identifying the ”intellectual foundations” 
of fascism marks the first part of his account on the history of the movement, pointing 
out the ideas of anachronically placed and diversely constructed thinkers, drawn 
from various national and intellectual traditions, the inquiry in the philosophical 
fundamentals of fascism seems at first glance futile. It might be, indeed, misplaced and 
overemphasized. Subjectively picking up and carefully collecting traces and nuances 
of the fascist ideology in the works of so different, though path-breaking, intellectuals 
(e.g. from Rousseau and Hegel to Nietzsche and Gobineau, from Goethe and Schelling 
to Barrès and Chamberlain, from Le Bon to Sorel, from Darwinism to the first instances 
of elite theory) seems far-fetched and incongruous an endeavor. Although a laudable 
attempt, it involves too directly and too markedly the researcher’s subjectivity and the 
fragmentary nature of such an attempt: the researcher tends to stress on those specific 
points in the oeuvres of some arbitrarily chosen thinkers in order to suits best his final 
interest, to sustain his initial hypothesis, by neglecting at the same time those ideas 
that would otherwise contradict or be irrelevant to the philosophical and ideological 
construct of fascism.
Hence, while endeavoring in the ”intellectual foundations” of the fascist ideology 
might prove to be futile, due to the quantum of subjectivity and superfluous reading 
involved, national histories of those countries in which fascism manifested itself more 
profoundly and organizational features of those movements perceived as ”fascist” are 
cornerstones in the explanatory model of generic fascism. Skimming through quite 
diverse right-wing or radical conservative organizations and movements during the 
first half of the 20th century, one may finally gather those defining characteristics of 
the fascist groups. Their successfulness in seizing and subsequently exercising power 
can be explained as a complex, a compound of structure, culture and contingency, 
from membership unity and dominant political culture to the nature of the regime 
under which they prepared their conquest of political power and the socio-economic 
situation of the country prior to the installation of the fascist government. In this sense, 
both successful and unsuccessful cases of fascist episodes are historically relevant, for 
they constitute essentially an incentive in identifying the causes and circumstances 
1 Antonio GRAMSCI, Passato e presente, Einaudi, Turin, 1951, p. 38, cited and translated in 
Thomas R. BATES (ed.), ”Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
vol. 36, no. 2, April-June 1975, p. 358.
2 Peter DRUCKER, ”Black Magic”, in Roger GRIFFIN (ed.), Fascism, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford & New York, 1995, pp. 27-271. 
3 Daniel GUÉRIN, The Brown Plague: Travels in late Weimar and Early Nazi Germany, Duke 
University Press, Durham & London, 1994 [originally published in French as Sur La Fascisme 
I – La Peste Brune, Maspero, Paris, 1965, followed by the famous Sur La Fascisme II – Fascisme et 
Grand Capital, in the same year]. In the old Marxist tradition, fascism is ”not only an instrument 
at the service of big business [of heavy industry], but, at the same time a mystical upheaval of 
the pauperized and discontented petty-bourgeoisie”. Alongside Rajani Palme Dutt (Fascism 
and Social Revolution, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1934), Guerin is considered among the first 
scholars to develop a revisionist (i.e. leftist) stance of the so-called ”Marxist theory of fascism”. 
For Dutt, fascism is ”the most complete expression of the whole tendency of modern capitalism 
in decay”.
4 Roger EATWELL, Fascism. A History, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, New York, 1996, 
pp. 3-16. 
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that made a very contingent number of fascist groups turn into movements and, 
concurrently, a still more limited number of fascist movements turn into well-
entrenched, established fascist regimes.
The Manichean vision of the world, of the irreducible struggle between good and 
bad with no shades of gray, – a characteristic of fascism mentioned by Roger Eatwell1 – 
hints to the unwillingness to compromise of the fascist groups and to what Nietzsche, 
a Nazi favorite reading, had previously labeled as ”the will to power”2. Nevertheless, 
in practice, this Manichean perspective proved to be at least approximate and putative: 
the reduced number of successful cases of fully-fledged fascist regimes demonstrates 
that only pragmatic fascist movements, capable of indulging themselves in small, but 
important compromises, give-and-take activities or half-measures, were actually able 
to implement durable institutions and procedures that would eventually reflect this 
Manicheanism. But unleashing this black-and-white stance too soon in the evolution 
of the movement or hanging on to idealist, purely ideological, Manichean messages 
like grim death proved pedestrian to the attempt to acquire and exercise power and 
noxious to the fate of the movement itself. Those groups seeking idealistically the 
total control of the society, unwilling to nuance their radical, extreme ideas in their 
initial moments of expression on the political scene, were meant to fail simply because 
of their idealism and radicalism. To this point, a ”biological” dimension of the nature 
and the means of organization of the fascist groups must be added: the successful 
cases of fascist regimes pertain to those groups formed of middle-aged experienced, 
versatile individuals capable to adjust their methods for advancing their ultimate 
goal. Conversely, the unsuccessful episodes, those many abortive moments of fascism 
of the interwar period, are associated with the groups and movements whose leaders, 
members and followers were young people, holding extremely radical conceptions, 
idealizing these conceptions; these young people had fought the First World War and 
ended up completely disappointed of their governments following their immense 
effort on the battlefield and the great number of human and material losses. Hans 
Mommsen discusses ”cumulative radicalization”3 in the case of successful fascist 
regimes (i.e. increased radicalization during the last phases of the regime, with bargain 
and compromise in the initial steps of the movement’s organization and accession to 
power), that would run counter to a ”cumulative moderation” in the internal dynamics 
of the regime that constantly jeopardized the successfulness of the Italian case. 
Both pieces of collective memory and authorized histories refer to the 20th century 
as both the culmination of progress and civilization and a fatidic and agonizing period, 
imbued with horrors, devastating wars, malefic creations of a tired human spirit, the 
pure expression of threadbare evil, a parenthesis in the glorious history of humanity. 
After all, the 20th century bred the two infamous totalitarianisms, communism and 
fascism, exhausting the very meaning of the word ”evil”, maximum maximorum on the 
scale of systematic violence, two overall terrifying political experiences, so exactly 
characterized by genocidal massacres and authoritarian and criminal propensities. 
Hence, studying fascism is inseparably linked to the study of the 20th century. 
1 Ibidem, p. xix. 
2 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, transl. by Ian C. Johnston, first published 
in 1887, in Leipzig, in the 2nd Essay (XII and XVIII) and in the 3rd Essay (XI, XIV, XV, XVIII). 
3 Hans MOMMSEN, ”National-Socialism: Continuity and Change”, in Walter LAQUEUR 
(ed.), Fascism: A Reader’s Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography, University of California 
Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1976, pp. 151-192/pp. 178-179. 
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Secondly, fascism, as did communism, imprinted the human mind with a dangerous 
range of unrelinguished traumas and anxieties. It is this painful series of profoundly 
disturbing sentiments that would sooner or later, though surely, outburst in other 
shocking historical episodes. This is another valid reason that would justify the study 
of fascism, at a basic, rather psychological, level. 
Another aspect in the study of fascism – as in the study of authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes, as well – lies in the popular perceptions associated with movements 
and governments of fascist nature. One cannot neglect or refute the terrible social 
and economic difficulties the countries in which fascism expressed itself to the fullest 
experienced a priori to the installation of dictatorship: one of the factors conducive to 
the rise of fascism had been identified as being the grave socio-economic situation 
these countries found themselves in the postwar period, following the devastating 
World War I, the status of defeated in the war and the world economic crisis of 1929-
1933. On the background of the ”red threat”, the fascist movements throughout 
Europe appeared as a viable solution for the extended crisis, a controllable solution 
for the conservative governments of Central and Eastern Europe. In the short run, the 
fascist rule provided welfare for the people and ameliorated the economic crisis, while 
edulcorating the interwar social grievances. As it remained in history, the ”slogan” of 
Nazism during the war was ”keeping the people at home happy”. The social security 
offered by the regime ensured the minimum support of the people and the overall 
acceptance for its infamous policies: it assured the regime’s stability. The conjecture of 
fascism creating a ”one-dimensional society” and favoring welfare was advanced in the 
60s by Herbert Marcuse, who argued that fascism installed only in advanced industrial 
societies where increasing affluence facilitated the dilution of the social conflict, the 
annulment of public debate, the exhaustion and the absorption and annihilation of any 
form of opposition or resistance. The argument that welfare subdues opposition to the 
regime is still under scrutiny and remains to be convincingly tested1.
It has become conspicuous that classical ”totalitarian paradigm”, put forward by 
Hannah Arendt in her magistral 1951’ The Origins of Totalitarianism, seems insufficient 
in explaining the subtleties and complexities of a regime whose rise and consolidation 
remain problematic for sophisticated explanatory models. The same holds true for 
1966’ Karl Friedrich’ and Brzezinski’s ”philosopher’s stone” for the study of the species 
of totalitarianisms, panacea for all dead-ends in the inquiries into fascist polities, 
the ”six-point syndrome of inter-related traits” combining the characteristics of: an 
official ideology; a single mass party, usually led by an all-powerful leader; a system 
of terroristic police control; monopoly control of the means of mass communication; a 
monopoly of arms, and the central control of the economy2. Though both theoretical 
frameworks construct paradigms of irrefutable significance in the definition of both 
”fascism” and ”communism”, they display a series of conceptual limitations, due 
primarily to their rigid scheme. Karl D. Bracher’s interpretation of totalitarianism as a 
revolutionary form of authoritarianism works as a buffer zone between Arendt’s and 
Friedrich’s studies3. Wolfgang Sauer’s discussion of ”National Socialism” as a facet 
1 Herbert MARCUSE, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society, Routledge, London, 1964, p. 5.
2 Carl Joachim FRIEDRICH, Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI (eds.), Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1966, p. 9. 
3 Karl Dietrich BRACHER, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Consequences 
of National Socialism, Penguin University Books, Harmondsworth (UK), 1973.
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of ”totalitarianism”, on the other hand, seems an application of both studies, hence 
straightening their descriptive precision1. After all, the Italian fascism proclaimed 
the aim of the ”Stato Totalitario”, the strong state, as the fundament for a renewed, 
more powerful and more extended Impero Romano. Among the classical accounts 
on fascism, Ernst Nolte’s Three Faces of Fascism represents a monumental scientific 
explanatory endeavor; Nolte’s definition of fascism is commonsensical, unavoidable 
in every discussion on the topic; however, fascism as ”antimarxism, antiliberalism, 
anticonservatism”, centered on the leadership principle, on a party army and bearing 
the aim of totalitarianism2 does not explain too much on the fascist construct. It is 
true, general dissatisfaction with the entire political spectrum, after a world war and 
a world economic crisis, depressively evolved into the refutation of all established, 
consecrated ideological formulas, and the dangerous search for ”revolutionary” 
alternatives: as Mann perceptively observes, popularly, ”modernity was desirable but 
dangerous, liberalism was corrupt or disorderly, socialism meant chaos, secularism 
threatened moral absolutes”3, etc. Hence, the overall feeling that all existing political 
conceptions dramatically failed and disappointed was acutely widespread. But, the 
evolution from disenchantment to complete negation is problematic in explanation 
following Nolte’s definition. 
Nevertheless, the contingent character of the pioneering models of defining 
and understanding ”totalitarianism”, generally, and ”fascism”, specifically, is 
explaina ble through the novelty of the regime in the 20th century; these limitations 
have been somehow overcome during the last decades of research. Even so, the 
consecrated theoretical models are not to be neglected, since they provide the basics 
for distinguishing species of totalitarianism from autocracy and authoritarianism or 
from traditional forms of dictatorship (e.g. seeking ”total” control, the imperative for 
popular mobilization and energizing the atomized and inert masses for the purpose 
of abolishing ”the private” and creating ”the new man”, the prerequisite of a modern 
industrialized state, etc.). The prominence of the dictatorship, spelled out in the 
slogan ”everything for the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state”, 
the domination of the charismatic leader under the shield of the ”Führerprinzip” 
(as Klaus Hildebrand concludes in the German case, ”one should not talk about 
National Socialism but about Hitlerism”4, pointing to the centrality of the leader 
in decision-making mechanisms), the alleged anti-capitalist character in economy 
– were all features of fascism that were one by one refuted or reconfigured in new 
understandings after the first wave of writings on fascism and totalitarianism in the 
50s and 60s has eventually passed. The recent literature on fascism takes into account 
the instable character of Italian fascist regime and even some degree of power division 
1 Wolfgang SAUER, ”National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism ?”, American Historical 
Review, vol. LXXIII, no. 2, December 1967, pp. 404-422.
2 Ernst NOLTE, The Crisis of Liberal System and the Fascist Movements, Mentor Books, 
Dublin, 1995, p. 385. (originally published as Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen 
Bewegungen, R. Piper, Munich, 1968). 
3 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit., p. 355.
4 Klaus HILDEBRAND, quoted without exact reference in Timothy W. MASON, ”Intention 
and Explanation. A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism”, in 
Jane CAPLAN (ed.), Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class. Essays by Tim Mason, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 212-230/p. 218. In respect of National-Socialism, it is 
Tim Mason to introduce the notion of ”primacy of politics”.
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at the higher levels of leadership in the case of Nazism (as ”a more or less anarchic 
polycracy”1). Moreover, the volume and the magnitude of fascist historiography have 
reached considerable proportions. The large majority of pieces of academic inquiry 
tackles primarily aspects of organization of fascist movements and the consolidation 
of fascist regimes. The evolution of the study is conspicuous. Somewhat in answering 
Isaac Deutscher’s worries that ”posterity will understand all that even less than we [i.e. 
the contemporaneous scholarly to fascism] do”2, the scientific endeavors approaching 
fascism managed admirably to surpass the allegedly insurmountable obstacle posed 
by the ”absolutely unique character” of these regimes. 
From the ”totalitarian paradigm” of the 50s and 60s, the interpretation of ”fascism 
as crisis of modernity” dominant in the 70s evolved in the 90s in an increasing focus 
on racism, as a defining trait of fascism, with its extreme deviation in Nazism, the 
Holocaust. In this series of reinterpretations and theoretical reconfigurations, a 
central role is played by the studies aiming a reevaluation of the role of ideology in 
the consolidation of the fascist movements and, furthermore, in the perpetuation of 
a fascist regime. The topic bears a special significance for contemporaneity, simply 
because it puts a particular emphasis on the impact of ideas on current realities and 
on leadership, and the capacity of destructive conceptions to influence and reshape 
even well-entrenched theoretical constructs and philosophical traditions. Generally, 
intense, strong political messages are disseminated towards the masses, welcoming 
a tremendous appeal, especially when they are accompanied by a series of powerful, 
emotionally charged symbols to resonate with the overwhelming sentiments of 
the public. Young people, particularly, found the fascist ideology ”revolutionary” 
indeed, and were the first to proclaim their support for it3. Militancy in propagating 
the ideology proved vital in the fascist case. Eventually an advanced, 20th century’ 
composite of Enlightenment’s ”party of humanity” and Romanticism’s exacerbation of 
feelings and emotions4 constituted the quintessence of fascist philosophical construct, 
by its dissolution of century-long ideological conflicts. It is important to remember 
the classical theory of ”totalitarianism”, put forward by Hannah Arendt’s inaugural 
works, and its conspicuous shortcomings in discussing the place of ideology in the 
construction of both fascist movement and regime: classical inquiries argued for 
an ”ideological emptiness” at the core of the fascist system, since the ”totalitarian 
leader” himself does not sincerely believe in his own ideology; ideology is merely a 
1 Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, ”From Anti-Semitism to Extermination: A Historiographical Study 
of Nazi Policies Toward the Jews and an Essay in Interpretation”, Yad Vashem Studies, vol. 16, 
1984, pp. 1-50/p. 18, discussing the functionalist perspective regarding the implementation of 
anti-Jewish policies in the Third Reich. 
2 Isaac DEUTSCHER, The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
& London, 1968, p. 163.
3 Zibordi, cited by F. Carsten, argues the youngsters’ support (”those declassed by the 
war, the youngsters who went to the front before they were twenty years old and came back 
at the age of 23 or 24, being neither able nor willing to return to their studies or their places of 
work in a regular fashion”) was marginal as compared to the lower middle classes in the towns 
and in the countryside, the ”petty bourgeoisie”. Fascism becomes thusly ”the class struggle 
of the lower middle class which exists between capitalism and proletariat as the third [group] 
between two combatants” (Luigi Salvatorelli). Both Giovanni Zibordi and Luigi Salvatorelli 
are quoted in Francis L. CARSTEN, ”Interpretations of Fascism”, in Walter LAQUEUR (ed.), 
Fascism…cit., p. 416. 
4 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit., p. 365.
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rhetorical instrument useful in controlling, energizing and mobilizing the masses1. 
But, its falsified and counterfeited character can explain little of the spread it enjoyed 
in Europe at the end of the interwar period and elsewhere in the second half of the 
20th century. The recent literature tends to valorize the centrality of ideology in the 
fascist contexts, by opposing the series of actions motivated by pure ideological belief 
to the importance of those actions having as an end the capture of all means of control, 
manipulation and domination (the totalitarian paradigm). Here, the divide between 
”intentionalism” and ”functionalism” for the special case of Nazism is telling of the 
shift the position of ideology suffered in the scientific literature on fascism and can be 
extended to the Italian example, as well.
Eventually, it is of paramount importance to consider as well the functional 
concept of ”enemy” in the fascist imaginarium. The actuality of such a discussion is 
marked by the increasingly concerning political, social, national and ethnical conflicts 
in the developing regions of the world, which are masked under the disguise of 
”fascist” movements. If one considers as a working definition for ”fascism” Nolte’s 
triple negation, completed by Payne with a new series of negations, it might be argued 
that the ”enemies” of fascism were an infinite succession of political, social or national 
groups that ultimately comprised virtually the entire society. At a second glance, though 
initially confusing – rather intentionally, as to draw more popular support –, the fascist 
ideological construct had, from its infancy, isolated and conceptualized the notion of 
”enemy”, most notably (at least for the German case) in the ethnic sphere, but also in 
the political (the communists, the democrats) and the social fields. The identification 
of the ”enemy” suffered some mutations in the evolution from the movement to the 
regime, but generally, it translated the same agenda, expressed the same antagonisms, 
focused on the same target. The concept had to be humanized in order to stir hatred, 
mobilization, action, in order to initiate and to motivate the ”revolutionary fight”. The 
extermination, the violent annihilation and elimination of the enemy was perceived 
as a means for cleansing the ”vital space”, but the actual undertaking against the 
”enemies” radicalized gradually, being more or less systematized and carefully 
prepared and conducted and reaching the climax during the years of war.
In the same line of argumentation, the concept of ”revolution” in the definition and 
interpretation of fascist movements is increasingly problematic, since ”revolution” in 
itself poses incommensurable difficulties in definition2. In the pages of the impressive 
volume of scholarly research dedicated to revolutions, one can easily find references 
to the Italian fascism and Nazism as being instances of revolutionary forms3. At 
1 Hannah ARENDT, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1951.
2 Karl Kautsky would conclude about the concept: ”There are few concept over which 
there has been so much contention as that of ’revolution’ […] Few things are so ambiguous” 
(Karl KAUTSKY, The Social Revolution, C.H. Kerr, Chicago, 1902, p. 5). Isaac Kramick, among 
others, reiterates the same idea: ”Revolutionaries […] have usually devoted as much time and 
energy debating the nature of revolution as they have in efforts to bring one about. No surprise, 
then, that students of revolution have an equally difficult time in describing and defining the 
phenomenon of revolution” (Isaac KRAMNICK, ”Reflections on Revolution: Definition and 
Explanation in Recent Scholarship”, History and Theory, vol. 11, no. 1, January 1972, p. 26). The 
same can be applied, contingently, to fascism. 
3 See, for instance, Eugen WEBER, ”Revolution ? Counterrevolution ? What Revolution ?”, 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 9, no. 2, April 1974, pp. 3-47, or, most prominently, George 
L. MOSSE, The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism, Howard Fertig, New York, 
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the opposite pole, Marxist scholars define ”fascism” clearly and irrefutably at the 
antipodes of the Marxist dictatum, by labeling the former ”counter-revolutionary”, 
a monstrous product, a crisis of capitalism, reactionary device of capitalist deceitful 
maneuvers, etc.1 Recently, opposing Griffin’s insistence on ”palingenetic populist ultra-
nationalism”, young leftist scholar Dave Renton conceives fascism outside the logic 
of a ”revolution”, not primarily as ”an ideology, but as a specific form of reactionary 
mass movement”, bearing an intrinsic contradiction, because it is shaped ”at one 
1999. The label of ”revolution” attributed to fascism generically seems to express something 
quite different from what the usage of the word ”revolution” meant in 1789 or 1917. According 
to Close, the usage of the term ”revolution” is generally adopted in connection to fascisms 
”partly to justify their departure from legality, partly to claim originality and importance for 
their achievements” (David H. CLOSE, ”The Meaning of Revolution”, in David CLOSE, Carl 
BRIDGE (eds.), Revolution: A History of the Idea, Croom Helm, London & Sydney, 1985, p. 13). 
1 Mussolini himself, in his definition of ”fascism” refers generously to a ”revolution”: 
”Fascism […] believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus 
repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism – born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of 
cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy 
and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples […] Fascism is the complete opposite of […] 
Marxian Socialism […] Fascism, now and always, believes in holiness and in heroism; that is 
to say, in actions influenced by no economic motive, direct or indirect. And if the economic 
conception of history be denied […], it follows that the existence of an unchangeable and 
unchanging class-war is also denied. And above all Fascism denies that class-war can be the 
preponderant force in the transformation of society. […] Fascism combats the whole complex 
system of democratic ideology, and repudiates it […] Fascism denies that the majority, by the 
simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society […] ad it affirms the immutable, 
beneficial and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently leveled […] 
Fascism denies, in democracy, the absurd conventional untruth of political equality dressed 
out in the garb of collective irresponsibility, and the myth of ’happiness’ and indefinite progress 
[…] The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty, and its 
aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals 
or groups are relative […] [T]he Fascist State is itself conscious and has itself a will and a 
personality – thus it may be called the ’ethnic’ State […] The Fascist State organizes the nation, 
but leaves a sufficient margin of liberty to the individual; the latter is deprived of all useless and 
possibly harmful freedom, but retains what is essential […] For Fascism, the growth of empire, 
that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality […] Fascism 
is the doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies and the aspirations of a people […] 
But empire demands discipline, the coordination of all forces and a deeply felt sense of duty 
and sacrifice; this fact explains many aspects of the practical working of the regime […], the 
necessarily severe measures which must be taken against those who would oppose this spon-
taneous and inevitable movement […] If every age has its own characteristic doctrine, there 
are a thousand signs which point to Fascism as the characteristic doctrine of our time. For if a 
doctrine must be a living thing, this is proved by the fact that Fascism has created a living faith; 
and this faith is very powerful in the minds of men” (Benito MUSSOLINI, ”Fascism”, in Italian 
Encyclopedia, first published in 1932, quoted in Carl COHEN (ed.), Communism, Fascism and 
Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations, 2nd ed., Random House, New York, 1972, pp. 328-339). 
Mussolini points out quite clearly the ideological features of the movement: anti-pacifist, anti-
Marxist, anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian; the exacerbation of ”sacrifice”, vitalism, of natural 
ine quality between men, of spontaneity and dynamism, of war; statism, the expansionist-
imperialist pretence, the holistic-organicist view of the society, ”ethnic” nationalism, the apology 
(or necessity?) of violence and discipline, authoritarianism, the centrality of ideological 
”faith”, etc. 
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and the same time by mass support and reactionary goals”1. Renton’s definition is a 
hermeneutical extension of the earlier definition put forward by (self-entitled) post-
Marxist theoretician Mihály Vajda: fascism is ”a mass movement” that assumed for 
itself the task of ”solving the nation-specific developmental problems of industrial 
capitalism” under severe crisis2. Somehow accounting for the Marxist evolutions in 
the study of fascism. 
Every large-scale, well-documented, well-entrenched, famous, completely 
reliable scientific inquiry into fascism concludes with a final section dedicated to the 
relevance of fascism nowadays, including contemporaneous movements that display 
resembling features reminding of a fascist revival, groups or actions deemed to be 
fascist through their outlook, simple persons marked as fascist by their current M.O. 
or by a disturbing conviction. Thus, it might seem that fascism poses a persistent 
danger, outside its perennial theoretical problematic, in day-to-day life, in the public 
sphere, in the space of the democratic polity. A sense of intrinsic fear regarding the 
possibilities of fascist revival, even in the 21st century and in a democratic context tout 
court, is part of the explanation regarding the misleading usage of the term ”fascism”. 
The actual chances that fascism would resurface are difficult to measure – they might 
depend on the occurrence of a major socio-economic crisis, on the general popular 
disenchantment with mainstream politics, on ethnic-national ambiguities, on the rise 
of authoritarian alternatives and loyalties, etc. –, but the continuing concern in this 
sense justifies to the fullest the historical studies constantly undertaken by scholars 
outside the contingent spaces where fascism represented a historical reality. Mann, for 
instance, expresses his deep reservations regarding a fascist ”resurrection”, though 
admitting that, inescapably, one can find the five distinguishable features of fascism 
”scattered around the world, probably in varied combinations”3: the ”neo-fascist”, 
Holocaust-denial groups of the 70s lacked paramilitarism and popular support, the 
”neo-fascist” parties (e.g. MSI in Italy, NDP in Germany, BNP in UK, CP’86 in the 
Netherlands) registered really insignificant electoral scores, and the extreme right 
populism or ”radical populism” (e.g. ”Front National” in France, ”Republikaners” in 
Germany, the Austrian Freedom Party, ”Volksunie” and ”Vlaams Blok” in Belgium, 
DPP in Denmark, FrP in Norway) gained some attention though its anti-immigration 
stance. These parties gained the attention and the interest of the scholarly, as well. As 
expected, the perspectives on the topic of fascist revival within the party systems of 
some Western nations are varied, even divergent to some extent. The large majority of 
the academia, nonetheless, refutes the fascist character tout court of these organizations: 
they are either having a purely electoral agenda, betting on populism and negationism, 
or they display a conspicuous ambivalence towards ”the state”.
In an in-depth account on the evolution of ”Marxist theory of fascism”, A. James 
Gregor would observe the impressive progresses in the definition of the concept, 
but would simultaneously warn on an ”obsolete” distinction between leftist and 
rightist biasness: ”Our error has been to attempt to force each revolutionary instance 
1 Dave RENTON, Fascism: Theory and Practice, Pluto Press, London & Sterling (Virginia), 
1999, pp. 3, 104 and 106. Fascism is ”primarily a form of political mobilization, shaped by a 
distinctive relationship between a particular ideology and a specific form of mass movement”.
2 Mihály VAJDA, Fascism as a Mass Movement, Allison and Busby, London, 1976.
3 Michael MANN, Fascists, cit., p. 365. 
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into a procrustean bed of preconceptions”1. Naked to specific symbolism, Marxism, 
as studied by Gregor, is but a version of generic fascism. This blunt and shocking 
conclusion reads to the inauguration of a new epoch of definitions, interpretations, 
reconsiderations in the field of ”fascism studies”, transforming ”fascism” into a never-
ending territory of research, capable of no exhaustiveness.
Some Accounts on the Peculiarities of Fascism in Romania
As a particular case among the European fascisms, the Romanian fascism displays 
its own difficulties of analysis, posing further problems of definition. The main features 
of the Iron Guard movement2, its inception and its rise to power, its very short period 
in the government – all its evolution became intriguing for the scholars of fascism. 
Some (Nagy-Talavera3, for instance) figured that a comparative treatment with the 
neighboring Hungarian Arrow Cross would be telling in accounting for some sort 
of specificity of Eastern European fascism. Nevertheless, the differences between the 
two cases, the Hungarian and the Romanian ones, are conspicuous; they are not to be 
overlooked. One cannot neglect, for instance, the very fact that the two countries were, 
at the time of the Paris Peace Settlement in 1919, on the opposite camps, Romania 
among the victors, Hungary as one of the great defeated countries. Moreover, a look 
into the ”elite political cultures” of the two states would be illuminating, as well, in 
assessing the contingencies in treating Hungarian and Romanian fascisms similarly. 
As Karen Barkey has already observed in her inquiry into types of nationalism in 
East-Central Europe in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th 
century, the two countries experienced different types of nationhood and fashions of 
conceiving the national construct. Barkey ventures in differentiating, when discussing 
the Romanian and Hungarian cases before and after the First World War, between 
”political/ assimilationist nationalism” and ”ethnic, exclusionary nationalism”4. The 
1 A. James GREGOR, The Faces of Janus. Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century, Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London, 2000, p. x. 
2 From the very outset, it is important to mention that the Legion of the Archangel Michael 
– referred in the Western literature as the Iron Guard – is not the only movement in the late 
interwar Romania that displayed fascist traits: (1) the League for National Christian Defense – 
LANC (a prominent radically antisemitic group, led by A.C. Cuza), (2) the National Agrarian 
Party (presenting conspicuous features of authoritarianism and nationalism, led by O. Goga, 
what Payne would label as ”radical right”), (3) the National Socialist Party of Romania – PSNR 
(as its very name denotes, a poor attempt to imitate the German model, initiated by Ştefan 
Tătărescu). An attempt to form a Nazi-styled organization of the Romanian Germans was 
registered in 1932-33, following the success of Hitler’s formation in Germany. After 1935, tiny 
and largely insignificant groups (a ”National Socialist Christian Peasant Party”, a ”Romanian 
Sacred Holy League”, ”a Military Nationalist Front”) and ”secessionist” groups from the 
Legion (”Swastika of Fire”, ”Crusade of Romanianism”, etc.) crowded the political scene and 
the Romanian society in the second part of the 30s. Lastly, as Payne observes in A History of 
Fascism (pp. 278-279), the entire Romanian political scene departed from democratic practice, 
shifting to moderate or radical forms of authoritarianism and nationalism.  
3 Nicolas M. NAGY-TALAVERA, The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in 
Hungary and Rumania, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford (California), 1970.
4 Karen BARKEY, ”Negotiated Paths to Nationhood: a Comparison of Hungary and 
Romania in the Early Twentieth Century”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 14, no. 3, 
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antagonism between some sort of inclusive and exclusive nationalisms is attenuated, 
blurred, since, through demographic and modernization mutations, one country 
can experience the two types of conceiving nationhood during different historical 
episodes. It is the case of Hungary, but not of Romania. Hungary and Romania are 
epitomes for fascist moments born out of similar conceptions of nationhood. On 
the one hand, Hungary had developed an assimilationist nationalism up to the 
Treaty of Trianon of 1919, taking into account that it had incorporated 53.35% of its 
population as minority groups (Germans, Jews, Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, 
Ruthenes, Russians, etc.1); prior to 1919, Hungary nurtured a quite peculiar form of 
”civic nationalism in the East”, acting as a veritable ”melting pot” for its cohabiting 
nationalities before losing two-thirds of its territory. After 1919, Hungary – now rather 
homogeneous in ethnic terms –, adopted a type of exclusionary nationalism. On the 
other hand, Romania, a small, ethnically homogeneous state before 1918, practiced 
a nationalist rhetoric that proved predominantly ethnic, cultural traits; after the 
Great Unification, doubling its size and incorporating not only Romanians, but large 
numbers of minorities (Hungarians, Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, Germans – a total of 
30% of the population2), Romania stuck to the same exclusionary, ethnic conception of 
nationhood. This perpetuation of exclusionary, xenophobic nationalism is, according 
to Barkey, the expression of a consensus among elites regarding the manner in which 
nation is to be conceived (singular if one considers the divides on party lines regarding 
social, political, economic developments) and an unusual attachment between 
professionalized politicians and public intellectuals3. While divergence flourished in 
the programme of state- and nation-building among the dominant political parties of 
the interwar period, ”Romanization” was on every party’s political agenda.
Sideration, perplexity and confusion had characterized the first attempts to 
analyze, explain and, finally, define the Romanian fascism. Questions were raised 
regarding: the strange setting of a successful anti-bourgeois, anti-Marxist, anti-
democratic movement in an underdeveloped, preponderantly agrarian country, with 
neither democratic experience nor socialist turmoil (due to the absence of a numerous, 
well-entrenched, well organized working class); the peculiarity of a reactionary, 
revanchist movement in a country which gained considerably from the First World 
War; the social composition of the support fascism enjoyed in Romania (i.e. largely 
students, not middle class bourgeois layers and workers); the insistence on other 
ideological aspects as the ones inaugurated and imposed by the Italian and German 
successful fascisms (e.g. a certain ”cult of death”), etc. In a remarkable – through its 
Fall 2000, pp. 497-531/p. 499. Hence, what Barkey suggests is that one particular philosophical 
translation of nation-building cannot comprehensibly and exhaustively characterize the 
nationalism nurtured by a certain country. Visions on nationality and nationhood are ever-
changeable, even volatile.
1 For Hungary, the demographical statistics are to be found in Aurel C. POPOVICI, Die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Grossöesterreich, Verlag von B. Elischer Nachfolger, Leipzig, 1906, apud 
Carlile Aylmer MACARTNEY, National States and National Minorities, Russell and Russell, New 
York, 1968, p. 121.
2 For Romania, the demographical statistics are to be found in Irina LIVEZEANU, 
Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1950, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York), 1995, and Karen BARKEY, ”Negotiated Paths to 
Nationhood…cit.”, p. 524. 
3 N. Iorga’s and A.C. Cuza’s cases are paradigmatic for Barkey.
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courage – attempt, Zevedei Barbu1 essays at explaining the emergence of fascism 
even in the post-WWI victorious Romania: it was not the extremely humiliating and 
demo ralizing defeat and the subsequent terrible revanchist sentiments both at the 
elite level and grass-roots level, but the apparent general popular confusion and 
bewilderment with the legacy of the war, with the unbelievable gains of the Peace 
Settlements at the end of the war, with the management of a larger territory and a 
numerous – quite diverse ethnically – population composing the perpetual dream of 
a ”Greater Romania”. This considerable effort to cope with the new realities, for both 
the elite and the bulk of the population, is similar, for Barbu, to the psychological 
impact experienced by a ”nouveau riche”. Difficult to assess this psychological 
turmoil of a ”nouveau riche”2: this is the reason why Barbu introduces a series of new 
considerations and observations regarding the peculiarity of the Romanian case of 
fascism, such as: the provinciality of the movement (a sense of this provinciality is to 
be identified partly in the German case, as well, if one cares to remember that Dexler’s 
initially insignificant political formation – ”club” might be suitable – appeared in 
the highly industrialized Munich, a bastion of the ”working class”), the lack of any 
coherent, serious democratic attempts to reform in the interwar period (an interesting 
perspective, peculiar in an intellectual landscape in which the majority of scholars 
praises the Romanian ”democratic tradition” of the period 1918-1939), the inability 
to internalize democratic values in the compound of both ”elite political culture” and 
”community political culture”3, the extension of the franchise (hence, the entry into the 
political life of new social classes, more prone to radicalism, and the revision towards 
populism and propaganda, of the political mechanisms of persuasion), the intrinsic 
multi-ethnic character of the nation (and the great number of ethnic Jews, particularly 
1 Zevedei BARBU, ”Rumania”, in Stuart Joseph WOOLF (ed.), European Fascism, University 
of Reading, Vintage Books, London & New York, 1968, pp. 146-166. 
2 Though Payne attempts an explanation: ”[T]his enormous expansion [inaugurated by 
the Trianon Peace Settlement], together with Romania’s severe social, economic, and cultural 
backwardness, posed problems of the utmost severity. The country was faced at one and the 
same time with the challenge of building a greatly expanded and multiethnic nation, creating a 
demo cratic political system, and modernizing one of the weakest economies in eastern Europe. 
Partial democratization of some institutions only accelerated a kind of national identity crisis 
and a prolonged search for alternatives” (Stanley G. PAYNE, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison (Wisconsin), 1996, p. 277 [italics added]). The keyword 
here is ”backwardness” and the role played by this peril in the emergence of fascism in Romania, 
if one considers the consecrated cases of Italy and Germany, two highly industrialized countries 
(despite the economical injuries following the defeat in the ”Great War”). It is unclear in Payne 
and Barbu if backwardness is favorizing or inhibiting factor for the appearance of fascism, since 
the cases examined are ambivalent. The economic determinism is but a problem in approaching 
the Romanian case.
3 The phrase ”elite political culture”, as distinguishable from a ”community political culture” 
[”a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that emerge in response to 
the historical relationships between regime and community”] and a ”regime political culture” 
[”a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that emerge in response to 
the institutional definition of social, economic, and political life”], is to be found in Kenneth 
JOWITT, The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1992, pp. 51-52 and 54-56. ”Elite political culture” is ”a set of informal adaptative (behavioral 
and attitudinal) postures that emerge as response to and consequence of a given elite’s identity-
forming experiences.”
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in Moldavia), the pressure exerted by the ”red threat” coming from the East (some 
sort of fear of a new Russian domination, after centuries of suzerainty, limited 
autonomy, partial independence, etc.), the ambiguous, charismatic-authoritarian 
figure of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the intellectual-demagogic antisemitism of Cuza, 
etc. All these features, Barbu observes, made fascism conspicuously imminent for 
the Romanian society at the end of the interwar period. Barbu further insists, in an 
interesting study about the ”psycho-historical and sociological perspectives on the 
Iron Guard”1, on the peculiarities and specificities of the Romanian fascist movement 
– with an application on the movement led by Codreanu, other fascist groups in the 
interwar Romania being largely neglected –: the fascist desideratum of the ”New Man” 
as differently conceived in the case of legionarism (i.e. the legionnaire ”New Man” 
should have been primarily an Orthodox Romanian, completely loyal, devoted to the 
Fatherland, therefore inclined to martyrdom), the call for social cohesion and unity 
around the supervising figure of God, of the ”Conducător” and of a divine ”mission” 
of spiritual, moral regeneration and national reinvigoration, terrorism and assassinate 
as favorite political instruments, etc. 
The focus of the scholarly in respect to the Romanian case remained its proto- and 
pre-fascist features, fully expressed in the emergence and evolution of the Iron Guard. 
For a prolonged period, especially in the Western imaginarium, legionarism appeared as 
veiled in an aura of exotism, mysticism, extreme Orthodoxism, transcendent national 
and spiritual revival, cult of personality doubled by charismatic leadership. Payne’s 
emphasis on palingenetic, populist, ultranationalist manifestations oriented towards 
rebirth and regeneration would seem to characterize Romanian fascism quite properly. 
However, beyond the Balkan, exotic, dark, spiritual allure the Western writers tend 
to stress, legionarism is, as Ernst Nolte famously noted, ”the most interesting and the 
most complex fascist movement, because like geological formations of superimposed 
layers it presents at once both prefascist and radically fascist characteristics”2. 
Actually, it is Eugen Weber to become one of the most given to historian for the 
study of legionarism, his fortunate interest for the Legion of Archangel Michael and 
its impact on the Romanian politics during WWII being translated into impressive 
studies of historical-sociological-culturalist flavors concerning the emergence and the 
rise to power of what other scholars saw an ”abortive fascism”3. In a quite different 
fashion, Renzo De Felice thoroughly repudiates the fascist nature of the legionary 
phenomenon; for the Italian historian of fascism, the movement led by Codreanu 
is instead a fully-fledged manifestation of nationalist populism4, since it renounced 
1 Zevedei BARBU, ”Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, 
the Fascist Movement of Romania”, in Stein U. LARSE, Bernt HAGTVET, Jan P. MYKLEBUST 
(eds.), Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism, Universitetsforlaget & Colombia 
University Press, Bergen & New York, 1980, pp. 379-394. 
2 Ernst NOLTE, Die Faschistischen Bewegungen, DTV, Munich, 1966, p. 227 apud Stanley G. 
PAYNE, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, cit., p. 280.
3 Peter WILES, for instance, fails to see the fascist element(s) in the legionary movement; 
his emphasis is rather on populism. See Peter WILES, ”A Syndrome, Not A Doctrine. Some 
Elementary Theses on Populism”, in Ghiţă IONESCU, Ernest GELLNER (eds.), Populism. Its 
Meanings and National Characteristics, Weinfeld & Nicholson, London, 1969, pp. 166-179/176-177. 
4 Renzo de FELICE, ”Der Faschismus, Ein Interview von Michael A Leeden”, Nachwort 
von Jens Petersen, Stuttgart, 1977 apud Armin HEINEM, Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail. O 
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the entire ideological compendium (from the insistence on intense industrialization to 
secularism) characterizing fascism in the West.
One can refer, in the case of Romanian fascism, of the immanent nature of 
an ”integral nationalism”1, a peculiar form of nationalist sentiment; it becomes 
conspicuous that ”integral” nationalism employs in its construction (i.e. strategies, 
rhetoric, ideas) predominantly the blood and race bounds between individuals 
in a historically-defined community, common traditions and a shared ancestry. By 
spotting the propensities towards aspects of common ethnic and historical bondage, 
this type of nationalism is designed to augment the differences between ”nations” 
and, in addition, to exacerbate the superiority of one ”chosen nation” that has the 
obligation – due specifically to its cultural-ethnic prevalence – to govern over the other 
nations2. Emerged as an alternative between westernizers and nativists, the Romanian 
fascism, rather closer to the latter, appeared as a viable ideological response to socio-
economic and identity dilemmas. Deeply concerned with what Eatwell would see 
as the ”intellectual foundations” of Romanian fascism (i.e. a particular emphasis on 
Eminescu’s mystical nationalism of the 19th century, the conservative nationalism of 
the Germanophile ”Junimea”, C. Stere’s peasant populism of the beginning of the 20th 
century, Mihail Manoilescu’s ”neoliberal” version of corporatism, etc.), Nagy-Talavera 
is right in stressing both the similarities between the Iron Guard and the consecrated 
models (especially the Italian one, with which the Romanian movement shares the 
mechanisms of implementing terror and the organizational scheme) and the uniqueness 
of the movement (the ”ideological deviations” to traditional, Orthodox values, its 
popular appeal, etc.) Yet another specificity, especially in the debuting instances of 
the movement, is its student membership and its general appeal to university circles; 
Weber would explain that university milieux, as autonomous loci for public debate, for 
deliberative endeavors concerning the national problems and the course of politics, 
work as incubators for frequently radical, extreme political alternatives. Moreover, the 
students’ involvement in the radicalization of politics is symptomatic for backward 
societies, in which students formed the only organized group, possessing a sort of 
group consciousness or solidarity, in the absence of a numerous, unionized working 
class and a coherently organized peasantry. The impact of students in legionarism 
is immanent, since the movement stressed on youth, vitality, vigour, powerful will, 
dynamism, spontaneity, radicalism. But the hypothesis that the fascist movement – as 
contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional, transl. from German by Cornelia and Delia 
Eşianu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 21.
1 The collocation ”integral nationalism” is to be found for the first time in Charles 
Maurras, ”Le Nationalisme intégral”, Le Soleil, on the 2nd of March 1900, and it was soon 
taken over in various classification of nationalism(s) (for instance, in Andrew VINCENT, 
”Liberal Nationalism: an Irresponsible Compound ?”, Political Studies, vol. 45, no. 2, June 1997, 
pp. 275-295 (by differentiating between (1) ”liberal Risorgimento” nationalism, (2) ”traditionalist 
conservative” nationalism, and (3) ”integral” nationalism), in Peter ALTER, Nationalism, 
Edward Arnold, London, 1989, pp. 99-117 (”Risorgimento”, ”reform”, and ”integral” 
nationa lism) and Carlton J. HAYES, Essays in Nationalism, Macmillan, New York, 1926, ch. 4 
(a sequence of ”humanitarian”, ”Jacobin”, ”liberal”, ”traditionalist”, ”economic”, ”protec tio-
nist” and ”integral totalitarian” nationalisms).
2 On the role of ”integral nationalism” in shaping the Romanian fascism, see Robert 
BIDELEUX, Ian JEFFRIES, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, Routledge, London, 
1998, pp. 387-389.
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expressed by the Iron Guard –, being initially a student movement, was to be marginal 
in Romanian politics, aggregating the interests of a specific social group, can easily be 
refuted: it is interesting how the students’ demands superposed and coincided with 
the amorphous mass of peasants, transforming the Iron Guard into a mass movement, 
with a significant support1. The radical conceptions of some ”public intellectuals”, 
popular figures of the time, can add to this. From a small, very radical student group to 
the ”legionary national state” of September 14, 1940-February, 14, 1941 (with the vice-
presidency of the Council of Ministers, four ministries and five state under-secretaries 
and, above all, with the Legion being the ”only movement recognized by the new 
state”2), there was an important and long way to go, in which radicalized politics, 
violence and antisemitism came to draw larger and larger popular support.
One may hypothesize that legionarism is another ”form without substance” in 
the Romanian institutional and societal landscape during the interwar period: though 
sharing many features with the Western and Central European ”prototypes”, fascism in 
Romania was extremely nationalist indeed, but it encompassed, as well, traditionalist 
and Orthodoxist ideological aspects and it appealed to different classes, other than 
the middle-class bourgeoisie or some segments of the working class, since these social 
groups were numerically reduced in an underdeveloped Romania. Therefore, fascism 
in Romania could not have been a crisis of the declining bourgeoisie – as the Marxist 
postulate insistently proclaims –, simply because the Romanian bourgeoisie was still 
in its infancy, on a background powerfully dominated by a rural milieu and an agrarian 
economy. As opposed to the successful instances of fascism in Italy and Germany, the 
Iron Guard professed a return to traditional, ancestral values, on which a process of 
divinely-supervised regeneration of the nation would commence. Conversely, it was 
even vocal in opposing the bourgeoisie, by vividly attacking the decadent, cosmopolitan 
bourgeois values and lifestyle, its corrupt and vicious means of accumulating wealth 
and power. In doing so, the guardists could not have distinguished themselves from 
the socialists and communists, even if the two ”revolutionary” movements did so on 
different grounds, their political-ideological motivations being different. But the far/ 
extreme left in Romania was virtually non-existent, in the absence of a numerous, 
organized working class. One should add to this the elite consensus on the organic 
1 A short description of students’ social status and the inception of radicalism among 
them is to be found in Zvi YAVETZ, ”An Eyewitness Note: Reflections on the Rumanian Iron 
Guard”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 26, nos. 3-4, September 1991: ”The Impact of Western 
Nationalisms: Essays Dedicated to Walter Z. Laqueur on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday”), pp. 597-
610 (especially pp. 599-602). 
2 Dinu C. GIURESCU, Stephen FISCHER-GALAŢI (eds.), Romania: A Historical Perspective, 
East European Monographs & Columbia University Press, Boulder & New York, 1998, pp. 330-
331. The intransigency of the Legion, its unwillingness to compromise, its insistence on the 
imperative of (a too idealistic) ”revolution”, once it seized power in 1940 (in a limited, ”dualist” 
share of power with General Antonescu), remembers Mussolini’s tone when explaining the 
initial intentions, the ”missions” of fascism, in 1932: ”A legionary regime cannot survive with a 
liberal economic structure […] The legionary regime needs a government legionary in spirit, a 
totalitarian government. Totalitarian government means the political monopoly of a movement, the 
movement that has won, exclusiveness […] In legionary Romania there is no place for any other 
party […] The legionary regime implies control over the press […], complete control over the 
economy, in opposition to the old liberal economy […] Any blocking of the legionary revolution is 
fatal for the country” (Horia Sima, quoted in Dinu C. GIURESCU, Stephen FISCHER-GALAŢI 
(eds.), Romania…cit., p. 331 [italics added]).
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nature of the ”nation”, on the conception of ”nationhood” and ”national identity”; 
the general propensity towards collectivism, communitarianism. A political force 
virtually impossible to negotiate with, the Iron Guard, through its intransigent – if 
not single-minded – leaders and through an extremely radical ideology, was totally 
unwilling to compromise; this specious unwillingness to compromise and negotiation 
will delay its rise to power and would rapidly trigger its end. Its revolutionary 
mission will never be abandoned by both followers and leadership, particularly when 
its presence in the government assured its control of power1. Each local formation or 
breach (called ”cuib” – nest) shared a quite sophisticated initiation ceremony for the 
new members and the obedience to the ”six fundamental laws”: discipline, work, 
silence, education, mutual aid and honor2. The peculiarity of the Romanian fascist 
movement – a peculiarity that generated its quite short live in power, as well – lies 
also in its insistence, at the level of ideological construct, to spiritual transcendence 
through perpetual warfare within the telluric, ordinary, human, ”sinful” space, a 
war waged against the ethnically and morally impure, against the enemies of the 
Fatherland: ”All for the Fatherland” (”Totul pentru Ţară”) was the slogan to guide 
the actions of the guardists, for the sake of the ”nation”, interestingly conceived as 
”the Fatherland”. Irrespective of the final state of the legionnaire-warrior – since the 
desirability of the martyrdom was clearly expressed in the ideas of the Iron Guard –, 
the (physical) destruction of the enemy was imminent, imperatively necessary, for 
the advance of the community. The metaphor of Nietzschean ”will to power” was 
contingently employed in the Iron Guard’s rhetoric, for it implied also a feeble sense of 
individualism, incompatible with the communitarian, organicist dogma of Romanian 
fascism. This community should have undergone a process of purification, a catharsis 
through extreme violence, that would have led to its redemption and whose main 
generator would have been Codreanu’s movement; individual sacrifice – that should 
be accepted without any opposition, but with joy – was asked in this militancy for 
ultimate collective redemption. An unprecedented cult of death, a peculiar morbidity 
in this respect, were cherished within the movement, a trait of ”political theology” 
quite unique, since generally a sense of vitality, a propensity towards spontaneity 
and vibrant, active life were central in both Italian and German fascist rhetoric. The 
accent put on the virtual imperative of martyrdom and on the following significance 
of it (including the emphasis on the cult of death) was perceived as a specificity of 
legionarism by the scholarly on fascism, as an opposition towards secularism and as 
a return to religiosity, to Orthodox identity3. The resort to religion as identity indicator 
in the autochthonous fascist discourse is indeed unusual, though partly explicable. 
Romania exacerbated from the time of the national emancipation of Transylvania 
1 A reconsideration of the concept of ”revolution” in respect to legionarism is necessary. 
Its consecrated reactionary forms indicated rather a desire to restoration to a traditional, rural, 
Orthodox, morally superior, ethnically homogeneous, patriotically devoted Romania. This is 
the reason, as Weber perceptively noticed, the ideal of ”fascist revolution” was abandoned by 
the Iron Guard in favor of ”national unity”, of restoration of the ”golden age” of divine, ethic 
and ethnic, purity. See, Eugen WEBER, ”The Man of the Archangel”, Journal of Contemporary 
History, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1966, pp. 101-126/p. 105.
2 Stanley G. PAYNE, A History of Fascism, 1914-1 945, cit., p. 285.
3 Accounts on the specificities of legionnaire ”doctrine” are to be found in Radu IOANID, 
The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, East European Monographs & Colombia 
University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 83, 98-174.
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and of the unionist movement its ”enclave” character in the region, of both language 
(one of the descendent of the Roman legacy) and religion (similarly, Hungary would 
stress on its insularity in terms of language, its Finno-Ugric specificity). The Romanic-
Orthodox1 blend provided the fundament underpinning the xenophobic nationalism 
and a type of fanaticism-cum-self-destructiveness unparalleled by any other fascist 
manifestation. In pointing out the marked differences between fascism in the West 
and in the East, Weber convincingly reasons that, being in no need to compromise 
with the moderate, centrist forces on the political scene against a competing leftist 
extremism (virtually absent in agrarian Romania), fascism here could radicalize to a 
fuller extent, could preach revolution more freely and was able to work its imagination 
upon an ideological sophistication of ”totalitarian” reconfiguration unrestrainedly by 
any other radical-revolutionary alternative2. Moreover, in respect to its ”enemies” – 
the ”enemies” of the entire nation, after all –, the Legion of the Archangel Michael 
was ”possibly the only other fascist movement as vehemently antisemitic as German 
Nazis”3, in a favorable internal context, in which the national cultural traits indicated 
conspicuously a well-entrenched xenophobic popular attitude and a multitude of 
discriminatory policies. 
The movement lacked coherence in its political program, a programmatic 
ambiguity to be found especially in the German case. Similarly to paradigmatic cases, 
the Romanian fascists emphasized on the novelty of their agenda, the prospect of 
an upcoming spiritual purification of the nation, the creation of the ”new man”, the 
thorough reconfiguration of institutional framework, on the basis of collectivity, a 
corporate-like social advance and an economic development founded on communal, 
organic mechanisms. Somehow contrarily, Dylan Riley refers to legionarism as an 
instance of ”statist fascism”, resembling to the Italian and Spanish cases, the ”result of 
associational development in the context of a failed hegemonic politics”4; a ”state-led 
associational development” (as opposed to ”autonomous” or ”elite-led associational 
development”) generating a certain type of fascist movement would characterize 
the Romanian model. Riley identifies five ”stages of Romania’s path to fascism”: 
(1) and (2) the inability of forging both ”intraclass” and ”interclass” hegemony (i.e. deep 
fragmentation) at the level of social elite, following the adoption of the Constitution 
of 1866, and at the level of the peasantry, following the organization of the popular 
banks started in 1903; (3) the attempt to form an ”interclass hegemony” after WWI, 
through the pursuit of reconfiguring political, socio-economic, cultural reforms to 
accommodate the reality of a ”Greater”, multiethnic, multi-problematic Romania 
(e.g. a radical land reform, the introduction of universal suffrage, the first instances of 
1 Contrarily to the centrality of Christian Orthodox teachings in the construction of the 
Legion’s ideology, Constantin Iordachi argues that the autochthonous fascist ideology was 
inspired by the ”European Romantic historical ideologies of social palingenesis”, accessed 
through three main channels: (1) ”the tradition of national messianism”; (2) ”the sacralization 
of politics”, and (3) ”the conservative tradition of religious-patriotic militarism” (Constantin 
IORDACHI, ”God’s Chosen Warriors: Romantic Palingenesis, Militarism and Fascism in 
Modern Romania”, in IDEM (ed.), Comparative Fascist Studies. New Perspectives, Routledge, 
London & New York, 2010, pp. 316-357.
2 Eugen WEBER, ”The Man of the Archangel”, cit., p. 105.
3 Stanley G. PAYNE, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, cit., p. 281.
4 Dylan J. RILEY, The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain, and Romania, 1870-
1945, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (Maryland), 2010, p. 144.
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mass parties, etc.); (4) the inability, clear by the early 30s, of both the Liberals and the 
Peasants to develop a veritable democratic regime; (5) the overcoming by Codreanu’s 
”party fascism” of two basic problems: (a) lacking a ”strong organizational basis” (in 
the absence of workers’ unionism and rural cooperativism) and (b) the fact that ”the 
overweening power of the political elite in Romania undermined the development of 
a political contest between left and right”1.
Finally, Emanuel Turczynski perceives and analyzes the fascist phenomenon 
in Romania as a moral and spiritual reaction to the centuries-dominant Oriental 
lifestyle2. Turczynski’s and Riley’s perspectives are (re-)considered partially in the 
impressive study on the ”political problems of an agrarian state”, authored by Henry 
L. Roberts3, who attempts a reevaluation of the historical autochthonous circumstances 
that inaugurated fascism in interwar Romania and the forms of manifestation of 
legionarism. The attempts described above by Riley, to rapid democratization and 
industrialization, destabilized the Romanian society, which, in response, reactivated 
and accessed as a defensive mechanisms its behavioral and attitudinal deviations, 
from inherent antisemitism, exacerbated nationalism, xenophobic adversity, to anti-
Communist augmented fear, disregard for and opposition to parliamentarism, a 
preference for violent political resolutions, an inclination to ruralism and communal-
organicist conception of society, and a powerful desire to transform and reconfigure, 
on moral/religious grounds, the totality of this society. Roberts defines Romanian 
fascism as a political current epitomized by negationism towards the existing political 
alternatives, towards the institutional framework, a plague started in the intellectual 
spheres contaminating the lower strata, through its recourse to irrationality. Despite 
the harsh observations regarding the composition of the legionary movement – 
Alexandru Creţianu would identify among the militants ”largely pseudo-intellectual 
riff-raff unable or unwilling to make a decent living, and who sought refuge in a 
mystic nationalism, the only reality of which was a ferocious antisemitism”, ”white-
collar workers, unsuccessful students, and various dilettanti transformed into political 
zealots, […] déclassés and [representatives of the] lumpenproletariat”4 –, one should not 
forget that these legionnaires preached central moral virtues to which any Romanian – 
any human being – perennially aspires: honesty, responsibility, correctness, reliability, 
vitality, the will to transform, hard work for a better world, industriousness5.
1 Ibidem, p. 144-147. Riley strangely distinguishes between ”party fascism” (traditionally 
represented by the Iron Guard) and ”statist fascism” (embodied by the Carolist dictatorship). 
2 Emanuel TURCZYNSKI, ”The Background of Romanian Fascism”, in Peter F. SUGAR 
(ed.), Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945, ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara (California), 
1971, pp. 98-112.
3 Henry L. ROBERTS, Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1951.
4 Alexandru CREŢIANU, The Lost Opportunity, J. Cape, London, 1957, p. 20. 
5 Eugen WEBER, ”The Man of the Archangel”, cit., p. 106.
